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Abstract 
There is a recognised trend of manufacturing companies offering not only products, 
but services and even complete solutions to business problems. Research has 
highlighted economic, market demand and competitiveness factors as responsible for 
the re-shaping of business strategies that this has involved. This study analyses the 
extent to which another factor, technology, has been a significant factor in the switch 
from product oriented to service oriented strategies. A case study of the aero engine 
manufacturer Rolls-Royce is used to analyse the impact of technology, which is found 
to have led manufacturers to re-shape their business strategies. The study finds that 
developments in one technology in particular, namely digital electronics, have been a 
powerful enabling factor facilitating the implementation of service strategies. This 
provided original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) like Rolls-Royce with a 
competitive advantage relative to conventional service providers, by enabling them to 
acquire new knowledge management capabilities. 
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‘Power-by-the-hour’: The Role of Technology in Re-shaping Business Strategy  
at Rolls-Royce 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The management literature urging manufacturers to make the transition from 
supplying products to supplying products and services on an integrated basis is very 
extensive (Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003). In terms of industry sectors, the literature that 
has highlighted and analysed this trend extends mainly to capital goods, including 
computing, cranes, trains, and aerospace (Howells, 2004).  
 
The logic behind manufacturers moving forward along the value chain to include the 
provision of services as well as manufacturing is normally attributed to three main 
determinants: economic factors, demand conditions and competitive advantage (Oliva 
and Kallenberg, 2003). The economic argument is that through the provision of 
services additional revenue can be generated from an installed base of products 
especially if the product life cycle is a long one with products remaining in service for 
many years. To reinforce this it is also pointed out that services typically yield 
significantly higher margins than products. The case for demand conditions is that as 
customers become more sophisticated so their expectations rise and they demand 
solutions rather than mere products. Often this is set in terms of the trend towards 
greater specialisation and a move on the part of many companies to outsource services 
as they focus on core competences (Pralahad and Hamel, 1990). Finally the case for 
competitiveness rests on the notion that services are often more difficult to imitate and 
therefore are a source of potential competitive advantage. 
 
However very few studies have looked at alternative perspectives. For instance there 
has been little consideration of what one would intuitively expect to be an important 
driver behind this trend towards the provision of services, namely technology. One 
might well argue that such has been the attention given by strategy researchers to 
concepts like core competences (Pralahad and Hamel, 1990), that technology, 
particularly long term technological change has taken something of an analytical back 
seat, when it comes to analysing the forces that shape business strategy. This study 
3 
 
attempts a re-assessment. The study looks specifically at the part that technology 
plays as a factor in the transition from products to services, especially the move 
towards offering integrated solutions using new business models. The aim is to 
analyse the role of technology in re-shaping the business strategy of manufacturers as 
they extend their product offerings. The study seeks to answer a single research 
question – what role did technology play in re-shaping business strategy in the aero 
engine sector? Here the focus is on the industry environment (Grant, 2008: 66) and 
how this has changed as a result of macro-level factors, specifically developments in 
technology and the resulting response from manufacturers in terms of revising and re-
shaping their business strategy. To answer this question the study analyses recent 
developments in the aero engine sector of the aerospace industry through a case study 
of a company often cited as an example of a manufacturer leading the way in offering 
not merely services, but integrated solutions, namely Britain’s largest manufacturing 
company, the aero engine manufacturer, Rolls-Royce. 
 
2. Review of the Literature 
The trend towards manufacturing companies moving into the provision of services 
was first highlighted in the 1980s by Vandermerwe and Rada (1988: 315), who coined 
the term ‘servitization’ to describe the phenomenon. The provision of services is now 
a conscious and explicit strategy for many firms, resulting in a steady flow of research 
papers analyzing this trend with a variety of terms used to describe it. Baines et al. 
(2009: 522) refer to it as ‘product-service strategy’ and Howells (2004: 25), noting the 
way services are sometimes bundled as a ‘wrapper’ complementing products, uses the 
term ‘service encapsulation’. Wise and Baumgartner (1999), Davies (2004) and 
Windahl et al. (2004) on the other hand note that the move into services sometimes 
involves very much more than simply bundling the provision of complementary 
services along with the product. They use the term ‘integrated solutions’ to describe a 
business model where services are typically not an add-on to a product, rather 
products and services are combined to address specific customer needs.  
 
A key feature of the integrated solutions business model is that it is about much more 
than just moving down the value chain to provide services as well as products. With 
this business model manufacturers typically ‘take over the risks and responsibilities of 
performing activities previously handled in-house by their customers’ (Davies, 2004: 
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732), and in exchange for providing much greater value, they get a significantly 
higher return. Risk in this context refers to the possibility of a product mal-function 
leading to a potential loss of service, and the responsibility is to fix it ensure there is 
no loss of service. Assuming a level of risk implies more than providing additional 
services since services are being provided on a quite different basis, leading to the use 
of terms such as ‘performance-based contract’ (Kim et al., 2007) and ‘outcome-based 
contract’ (Ng et al., 2009) to describe packages where the customer is buying not 
merely services along with a product but, ‘a predetermined level of availability to 
meet the customer’s objectives’ (Kim et al., 2007: 1844). What is provided goes well 
beyond replacing the sale of goods, with the sale of goods plus support services. With 
such contracts the integrated solution typically extends to the service provider 
agreeing to carry out all necessary maintenance and guaranteeing a given level of 
product availability and performance, at a fixed price normally based on usage.   
 
Davies (2004) suggests that the trend towards the provision of outcomes is 
particularly a feature of capital goods producers. Given that capital goods tend to have 
a comparatively long life, this has led some researchers to use expressions like  ‘long 
term service agreement’ (Kerr and Ivey, 2001: 290) and ‘through-life management’ 
(Ward and Graves, 2007: 457) to describe the provision not merely  of  products but 
support services for them over the course of their life.   
 
According to Wise and Baumgartner (1999)  the particular attraction of servitization 
for capital goods manufacturers is that it allows them to make use of their installed 
base comprising the total number of their products currently in use.  For capital goods 
manufacturers whose products are durable and have a relatively long lifespan, this is 
typically many times greater than the value of their annual sales of products. As 
examples Wise and Baumgartner (1999) cite trains (i.e. locomotives), civil aircraft 
and tractors, where the installed base is ten or more times greater than annual sales.  
 
The inclusion of aerospace is no coincidence as several studies have looked at 
servitization in the aerospace sector. These range from studies that mainly cite 
aerospace as an example of this trend, to ones that provide a more detailed analysis of 
the factors at work and the impact on the firms. Among the former are studies by 
Baines et al. (2009), Davies et al. (2006), Howells (2004), Neely (2007) and Oliva 
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and Kallenberg (2003), which note how engine manufacturers like General Electric 
and Rolls-Royce now provide engine maintenance on an hours flown basis, and 
studies by Ng et al., (2009) and Kim et al. (2007) which use airframe maintenance as 
an example of the provision of performance based maintenance. 
 
Four studies (Johnstone et al., 2009; Kerr and Ivey, 2001; Lorrell et al., 2000; and 
Ward and Graves, 2007) specifically analyse the move to servitization in the 
aerospace industry. Johnstone et al. (2009) provide an in-depth case study that 
analyses how one engine manufacturer has moved into the provision of services. It 
broadly confirms Oliva and Kallenberg’s (2003) findings from other sectors noted 
earlier in this paper, that the three factors leading to servitization are economic factors, 
customer demands and the pursuit of competitive advantage. The authors (Johnstone 
et al., 2009) pinpoint two of these three factors, namely  economic factors in the form 
of cost pressures, and the need to provide a stronger customer focus given the trend 
towards greater use of outsourcing. They also note that implementation creates 
challenges in terms of gaining employee involvement and the integration of different 
parts of the organisation. A study by Ward and Graves (2007) surveyed eleven 
companies operating in different parts of the aerospace supply chain. It identified four 
factors behind servitization. Three were those noted by Oliva and Kallenberg (2003). 
The additional fourth factor identified by Ward and Graves (2007) was risk, 
specifically a desire to push the risks associated with revenue streams,  down the 
supply chain. The authors noted that this factor was less significant than the other 
three.  Ward and Graves (2007) also highlighted the importance of information 
systems in implementing this kind of service. Significantly Ward and Graves (2007) 
like Johnstone, Dainty and Wilkinson (2009) said little about the part played by 
technology, in providing information in the first place. In contrast, an earlier study by 
Lorrell et al. (2000), while noting the importance of the factors identified by Oliva 
and Kallenberg (2003), also cited industry specific institutional changes, in the form 
of market de-regulation, as an important driver particularly in the commercial sector. 
This they argued had caused manufacturers to re-think the way they do business. The 
study cited the move into services as a direct consequence of institutional changes, 
though it said little about the strategies of particular companies. 
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The most comprehensive analysis of servitization in the aerospace sector is that by 
Kerr and Ivey (2001). It focuses specifically on the aero engine sector and provides 
extensive contextualisation covering not only institutional changes but other changes 
affecting the sector in general and maintenance services in particular. A feature of the 
study is the attention it gives to economic factors especially the economics of engine 
maintenance. It also highlights the crucial importance of knowledge of engine 
performance characteristics in the provision of maintenance services, particularly the 
scope such knowledge provides for accurately predicting maintenance requirements 
and optimising engine performance. To this end the study notes that engine data is 
increasingly becoming available on a real time basis through the development of 
engine monitoring systems, and the authors highlight the implications of this for the 
engine manufacturers.  However relatively little is made of the part played by 
technology in facilitating this, nor does the study consider the wider implications of 
this for the strategies employed by the engine manufacturers.  
 
Overall the studies of the aerospace industry support and reinforce Oliva and 
Kallenberg’s (2003) general perspective on servitization that there are three main 
factors acting as drivers for servitization, namely economic factors, customer 
demands and  the pursuit of competitive advantage. The studies identify a small 
number of additional factors contributing to servitization, namely risk (Ward and 
Graves, 2007), institutional changes (Lorrell et al., 2000) and the increased 
availability of information (Kerr and Ivey, 2001), but none of the studies identifies 
any of these factors as being particularly important. 
 
Significantly none of the studies specifically cites technology, especially advances in 
technology, as a driver for servitization. One might argue that the study by Kerr and 
Ivey (2001) comes close because it did note how increased knowledge of product 
performance is becoming available through the development of engine health 
monitoring systems. However the study said nothing about the technologies that are 
helping to make this possible. In the light of this, and the way in which studies of 
servitization in aerospace like studies of other sectors have ignored advances in 
technology, as a possible factor behind servitization, this study seeks to rectify this 
omission.  
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3. Methodology 
A case study methodology was selected for two reasons. Firstly, because Eisenhardt 
(1989) argues that case study research focuses on the dynamics present in a given 
setting or context, and the focus of the study was factors influencing the re-shaping of 
strategy in  a specific industry context. Secondly because Voss et al. (2002) maintain 
that case study research is particularly appropriate for analysing changes in 
technology, and the impact of technology was a theme running throughout the study.  
 
Following Leonard-Barton (1990) a ‘dual’ methodology was used for data collection, 
involving both archival materials and interviews, both public and private in nature. 
The former were largely publicly available archival materials and reliance on them 
was justified on the grounds that Lazonick and Prencipe (2005), who have researched 
aerospace extensively,  maintain that with company level research on  strategy, much 
can be achieved with such materials. 
 
The archival materials included  a range of documentary sources. They consisted of 
documents published by the case company together with a range of specialist 
published materials covering aviation in general and the aerospace industry in 
particular. Among the case company documents consulted were annual reports from 
1970 to the present, the in-house quarterly magazine published by the case company 
from 1979 to the present, together with a range of reports that included technical 
summaries and market reports. The specialist published materials included both 
printed and online resources. Of these,  the most used item was the searchable online 
digital archive of the specialist aviation periodical Flight International, which is 
available from 1909-2009. This provided a number of contemporary reports (Lewis, 
1999; Paddon, 1988) on developments in engine technology. Other specialist aviation 
periodicals consulted included Aviation Week and Space Technology (Terino, 2005), 
Aerospace (Baldwin, 1993; Robins, 1994; Ruffles, 1986), Air International (Walters, 
1999) and Airways (Davis, 2010).  This was supplemented by further data, much of it 
technical in nature from specialist technical publications. These included material 
from the trade press such as Military and Aerospace Electronics (Wilson, 2003) which 
had been identified from online databases including Business Source Complete and 
ScienceDirect, and reports, lectures and other materials published by the principal 
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professional body in the UK dealing with aviation, the Royal Aeronautical Society 
(Howse, 2004: Robins, 2004).  
 
Alongside these documentary sources a number of specialist texts were used covering 
various aspects of aviation. These fell into two broad categories, those that were 
essentially of a technical nature and those that were largely historical. The former  
included several works covering a variety of aspects of engine technology (Gunston, 
1995; Kay, 2007; Miller and Sawers, 1968; and Rolls-Royce, 1966), while the latter 
included biographies (Hooker, 1984; and Rowe, 2005); corporate histories (Donne, 
1981; Pugh, 2002); and studies of the aviation industry (Bluestone et al., 1981; 
Langewiesche, 2010; and Whitford, 2007). 
 
The use of a number of different types of document served to ensure the quality of the 
evidence used.  The various types of document used were written either by specialist 
technical authors and journalists with many years’ experience, including a number 
who had previously worked in the industry often in a technical role, or by senior 
technical figures working for the case company, with extensive personal knowledge 
of the technologies and technological advances detailed in the case study.  
 
The data gathered in this way was corroborated and verified through a small number 
of interviews conducted using the key informant approach, a technique widely used in 
ethnographic studies (John and Reve, 1982;  Phillips, 1981). Five key informants 
were interviewed, having been selected not on a random basis but specifically because 
they occupied, or had until recently occupied, senior roles within the aerospace 
industry. This meant that they had specialised knowledge of the issues being 
researched (Kumar et al., 1993). They included a commercial director, a business 
development manager, a new product development manager, a finance director and an 
aerospace industry consultant. Four had been employed by companies that were 
partners of the case company on joint ventures or partnerships for major engine 
programmes at some point during the period covered by the case study. One had had 
worked as a contractor to the case company for many years.  The interviews were in 
Marshall and Rossman’s (1989: 94) terminology, ‘elite interviews’ with respondents 
well qualified to comment on the case company’s strategies, as well as industry trends 
and practices. Identification of the sample of key informants followed a snowballing 
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strategy similar to that outlined by Healey and Rawlinson (1991: 346), whereby 
having interviewed ‘one good senior contact’ that individual’s personal network 
proved very effective in identifying further suitable key informants. The interviews 
which were semi-structured lasted between 40 and 90 minutes and were recorded and 
transcribed. Four were conducted face-to-face while one was a telephone interview.  
 
Having amassed  a substantial body of data in this way it was then subjected to 
content analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2007) using a simple manual coding system based 
on critical incidents in relation to the development of aero engine technology. From 
this a timeline tracing the historical path of advances in engine technology was 
produced, which in turn formed the basis of the narrative for the detailed in-depth 
case study. In terms of analysis, the archival materials provided the initial basis for the 
development of the case study. The key informant interviews were then used to 
triangulate the emerging picture of developments within the case company and to 
evaluate the extent to which new technologies had contributed to the re-shaping of 
business strategy within it. 
 
4. Case study: Rolls-Royce plc 
4.1 Jet Engine Technology 
The jet engine that forms the powerplant of today’s modern jet airliner is a gas turbine 
made up of three main elements, a compressor, a combustor and a turbine (see figure 
1). While the first jet engines were turbojets, since the 1960s more efficient turbofan 
designs have been used. These have an inlet fan at the front which both draws air into 
the compressor and sends some into a bypass duct around the engine in order to cool 
it, reduce noise and generate a significant proportion of engine power. The function of 
the compressor, which comprises rows of ever smaller rotating blades on a central 
shaft (Scranton, 2011) is to compress the incoming air. The high pressure air is then 
mixed with atomised fuel and burnt in the combustor. This produces very hot gases 
which expand rapidly and are forced out of the back of the engine under intense 
pressure to provide the thrust which propels the aircraft forward (Rolls-Royce, 1966).  
On the way the exhaust gases drive a multi-stage turbine rotating at high speed which 
powers the compressor. The power generated is measured in pounds of thrust and 
early jet engines produced only limited thrust, typically less than 10,000lbs. 
************ 
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Insert Figure 1 
************ 
Although the jet engine was readily taken up by the military in the years immediately 
after World War Two for applications such as interceptor fighters (Geels, 2006), 
largely because of its performance in terms of power to weight, it was more than a 
decade before jet airliners became anything like a serious proposition for the world’s 
airlines. The cause of the delay was that although jet travel offered passengers  the 
twin potential benefits of speed and comfort, the development of the jet airliner in the 
early years was held back by two key factors, namely poor fuel economy and poor 
durability (Geels, 2006).  Early jet engines used a lot of fuel. Specific fuel 
consumption (sfc) on the first generation of turbojet engines was about 0.9 lb/hr/lb, 
making them significantly less fuel efficient than the piston engines they replaced (see 
figure 2). Although simpler than piston engines by virtue of replacing a reciprocating 
motion with a rotating motion, jet engines also required more maintenance than 
equivalent piston engines, by virtue of their novelty and their high operating 
temperatures (Miller and Sawers, 1968: 178) which demanded new and unproven 
materials. General Electric’s  J-47 engine for example, admittedly a military rather 
than a commercial engine, went for only 500 hours between overhauls even in the 
mid-1950s (Miller and Sawers, 1968: 186). Poor durability meant that mechanical 
parts like turbine blades had to be replaced after a short time, a serious problem for 
commercial airlines in view of the high levels of usage demanded of their aircraft. 
 
Key factors in improving engine performance in terms of fuel economy were the 
bypass ratio, the pressure  ratio and turbine inlet temperature (TET). As a base line 
Rolls-Royce’s first generation turbofan engine the RCo12 Conway which powered 
both British and American airliners in the 1960s had a bypass ratio of 0.3:1, a 
pressure ratio of 15:1  and an operating temperature of 1,050ᵒC (see table 1) . To 
improve fuel efficiency  engines needed to operate at higher temperatures and higher 
pressures so as to ensure fuel was turned into energy as efficiently as possible. 
Improving durability required a combination of factors including the development of 
stronger heat resistant materials, more effective design and improved manufacturing 
processes.  
 
*********** 
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Insert Table 1 
*********** 
 
************ 
Insert Figure 2 
************ 
 
4.2 Advances in Engine Technology 
Over the last 40 years successive generations of new engine have introduced advances 
in engine technology that have progressively improved not only engine performance 
but engine durability. Rolls-Royce’s RCo42 Conway engine which entered service in 
the 1960s included one significant innovation designed to boost durability, over first 
generation turbojets. Although the compressor utilized what were then conventional 
extruded aluminium blades (Howse, 2004), the Conway pioneered the use of forged 
nickel alloy turbine blades incorporating internal air cooling (Gunston, 1989, Hooker, 
1984: Whitford, 2007), which significantly extended the life of turbine blades. 
 
The successor to the Conway (Donne, 1981) was the Rolls-Royce RB211,  a very 
much larger and more powerful high bypass turbofan engine, that powered the first 
wide-bodied airliners like the Lockheed L-1011Tristar and Boeing 747.  Entering 
service in the early 1970s, it was designed to operate under more demanding 
conditions, including a much higher 5:1 bypass ratio, twice the pressure ratio and an 
operating temperature of 1,250ᵒC higher. It was more than twice as powerful as the 
earlier Conway and significantly more fuel efficient (see figure 2).  It also 
incorporated a number of technological advances designed to improve durability. 
Following the lead given by its American rivals General Electric and Pratt and 
Whitney, Rolls-Royce switched from forged to cast turbine blades, manufactured 
using the ‘lost wax’ process (Hooker, 1984). Substituting investment casting for 
forging not only allowed harder alloys to be used it also facilitated more effective and 
reliable internal cooling of turbine blades, resulting in them being significantly more 
durable. The 524 variant, a later and more powerful version of the RB211engine also 
incorporated film cooled turbine blades enabling them to operate at even higher 
temperatures, while the 535 variant used a new ‘directionally solidified’ blade (Howse, 
2004: 12) that was both stronger and more durable. 
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Later versions of Rolls-Royce’s 535 engine, designated the 535E4 that entered service 
in the late 1980s (Walters, 1999), saw the introduction of one of the most significant 
advances in engine technology (Robins, 1994), the hollow titanium wide chord blade  
fitted to the large fan at the front of the engine. Hitherto engine manufacturers had 
used narrow solid titanium blades. These suffered a number of disadvantages. They 
were heavy, a large number of them were needed and they required a mid-span 
support or snubber to prevent vibration. This significantly reduced aerodynamic 
efficiency. Rolls-Royce’s introduction of the much lighter and stronger hollow 
titanium wide chord fan (Prencipe, 2001) on the E4 version of its 535 engine, 
produced by an entirely new process of diffusion bonding (Howse, 2004: 18), resulted 
in a fan that was much lighter and much stronger (see figure 3). Many fewer blades 
were required, 22 as opposed to 33 on earlier versions (Baldwin, 1993), and it 
dispensed with a mid-span support,  resulting in a significant (4%) improvement in 
fuel efficiency (see figure 2). Being wider and stronger the blades were also more 
robust and durable resulting in less susceptibility to bird strikes and foreign object 
damage (FOD). 
 
Rolls-Royce’s latest generation of engine, the Trent and its associated variants that 
entered service in the late 1990s and 2000s on the new generation of large twin jet 
airliners like the Airbus A330 and Boeing 777,  introduced further advances in 
technology associated with design, materials and manufacturing processes, which 
again resulted in improvements not only in fuel efficiency (see figure 2) but 
particularly in engine durability. These included turbine blades made from advanced 
single crystal titanium alloys which eliminate the grain boundaries which reduce the 
life of conventionally cast blades (Owen, 2001: 132) and the introduction of thermal 
barrier coatings (Howse, 2004: 12). These advances in technology combined with 
improvements in internal cooling mean that turbine blades can now operate at 
1,800ᵒC while the base material only has a temperature capability of 1,350ᵒC. 
Another development with later versions of the Trent was the introduction of swept 
fan blades. Introduced on the Trent 900 engine that powers the Airbus A380 the swept 
fan requires fewer blades and significantly increases damage resistance and durability 
by centrifuging debris away from the engine core and down the bypass duct (Howse, 
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2004: 18). These changes mirrored similar developments at its rivals General Electric 
and Pratt and Whitney. 
 
With the development of ultra high-thrust engines like the Rolls-Royce Trent in the 
1990s, manufacturers were forced to develop engine control systems capable of 
handling a much greater number of engine parameters (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001), 
as the hydro-mechanical engine control systems used up until this point,  as one 
commentator (Paddon, 1988: 33) put it at the time, ‘just could not cope…. they were 
becoming mechanical monsters’.  As a result Rolls-Royce and the other leading 
engine makers who developed similar ultra-high thrust engines introduced full 
authority digital electronic control (FADEC) systems, which were fundamentally 
different from earlier engine control systems. Data on engine parameters, such as 
turbine temperature, fan speed, and altitude was now collected via electronic sensors 
in the form of transducers and thermocouples and communicated electronically to a 
computer which managed all aspects of engine performance. This mirrored the 
development of fly-by-wire (FBW) control systems for aircraft, described by 
Langeweische (2010: 99) as, ‘a marriage between electrical control circuits and digital 
computers’.  
 
The switch to digital electronics provided a number of benefits, particularly in terms 
of engine durability and reliability. Firstly FADEC systems record any deviations 
from the ideal operating range of the engine, thereby facilitating more effective 
maintenance. Secondly they ‘treat the engine very gently’ (Paddon, 1988: 34) 
meaning that because a FADEC system is constantly monitoring a large number of 
engine parameters it can make minute adjustments to the engine, thereby ensuring it is 
functioning as close to its ideal operating conditions as possible, so as to minimize 
wear and tear on components. Finally a FADEC system provides valuable system 
protection within the engine, so as to protect components from damage wherever 
possible thereby ensuring durability.  
 
The cumulative effect of advances in engine technology meant that by the 1990s 
when the first of the current generation of engines like the Rolls-Royce Trent entered 
service they not only exhibited a level of performance in terms of thrust and fuel 
efficiency (see table 1) that was a very substantial improvement on 30 years earlier, 
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their durability was also vastly improved compared to first generation turbofans like 
the Rolls-Royce RCo42 Conway. The extent of this improvement was reflected in the 
demand for spares  to replace worn and damaged components. Even in the early 
1980s a jet engine would consume a quantity of spares equivalent to the original value 
of the engine in about eight years (Whitford, 2007), but engines like the new Rolls-
Royce Trent that entered service at the end of the 1990s consumed this quantity of 
spares, not in eight years, but 25 years. For the engine makers this represented a very 
big drop in demand for spares and therefore their revenues.  
 
4.3 Re-shaping Business Strategy: From Product-centric to Customer-centric 
The dramatically reduced demand for spares brought on by advances in technology 
presented a particularly challenging problem for engine manufacturers like Rolls-
Royce. With the profit margin on spares estimated to be seven times higher than that 
on new engines (Markillie, 2009), it wasn’t just a matter of the loss of revenue but the 
loss of their most profitable revenue. Faced with this, Rolls-Royce began to revise and 
re-shape  its business strategy. Hitherto Rolls-Royce’s business strategy, like that of 
its American rivals Pratt and Whitney and General Electric, was a ‘product-centric’ 
strategy (Davies, 2004: 733), that aimed to maximise the breadth of its product 
portfolio.  By having the widest possible range of engines it aimed to offer the largest 
number of airframe applications for its engines thereby maximising the number of 
potential airline customers who could use its products. Not only that, having 
developed advanced technologies, such as its innovative hollow titanium wide chord 
fan, Rolls-Royce could then apply them to different types of engine. As figure 3 
shows the wide chord fan initially developed for the 535E4 variant of the RB211, was 
also fitted to Rolls-Royce’s 524 engine that powered the Boeing 747, the V2500 that 
powered the Airbus A320, A321 and A319 and the Tay engine that powered the 
Fokker F70 and the Gulfstream business jet.   This ‘dual use’ (Ruffles, 1986; Robins, 
2004) approach to new technologies served to spread R & D costs across different 
engine programmes leading to economies of scope (Swann, 2009). 
 
************ 
Insert Figure 3 
************ 
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Rolls-Royce’s vigorous pursuit of this product-centric business strategy meant that 
whereas in 1980 it sold engines for just four civil airframe applications, by 1996 this 
had risen to 27 (Rolls-Royce, 1997: 8) and as figure 4 shows deliveries of commercial 
engines which at the start of the 1990s had been around 400 per year had trebled to 
more than 1200 per year by the start of the new millennium. By the early 2000s the 
company had even displaced one time market leader Pratt and Whitney (Bluestone et 
al., 1981) to take second place in the worldwide market for aero engines (Lazonick 
and Prencipe, 2005) just behind arch rival General Electric. 
 
*********** 
Insert Figure 4 
*********** 
 
However just at the point when Rolls-Royce’s product-centric business strategy was 
finally yielding success, the company like its rivals, General Electric and Pratt and 
Whitney,  began to feel the impact of the cumulative advances in engine technology, 
in particular the cumulative improvements in engine durability.  Faced with this, in 
the 1990s Rolls-Royce, while continuing to pursue a broad product portfolio, began to 
re-shape its strategy along the lines of what Davies (2004: 732)  terms a ‘customer-
centric’ business strategy. This aimed to extract  greater value from one of the 
company’s most important assets, namely its installed engine base. This greater value 
was to come from offering not merely spare parts, but maintenance services as well, 
though offered on a very different basis from conventional MRO services with fixed 
price contracts linked to guarantees of engine availability.  
 
Historically Rolls-Royce, along with other OEMs had undertaken maintenance, repair 
and overhaul (MRO) work on a fairly minor scale. Indeed one study observed that, 
‘until the 1990s, repair and overhaul of its engines was not viewed as a mainstream 
activity’ (Pugh, 2002: 194). The OEMs limited their exposure to MRO to warranty 
work in the early part of an engine’s life (see figure 5), leaving the market to the in-
house engineering divisions of major airlines and independent MRO providers. The 
latter had become a more important part of the MRO market as airlines increasingly 
outsourced their maintenance work in order to focus on their core business. When 
outsourced in this way, MRO work was undertaken on a ‘time and materials’ basis 
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(Ward and Graves, 2007: 467) where the contract price was determined by actual 
costs in terms of staff time and spare parts used.  
 
*********** 
Insert Figure 5 
*********** 
 
In 1993, Rolls-Royce took its first tentative steps towards a customer-centric strategy 
with the  setting up of a separate company, Rolls-Royce Aero Engine  Services Ltd, 
designed to pool together the repair and overhaul facilities that had hitherto operated 
independently at sites in Derby, Bristol, Coventry and Scotland in the UK and 
overseas in Canada and Brazil. The company then set about putting in place an 
appropriate infrastructure  with which to deliver MRO services on a global basis. 
Additional facilities for repair and overhaul work were acquired around the world, 
chiefly through a succession of joint ventures with airlines (see table 2). By 2001, this 
expansion had grown the company’s repair and overhaul business from a modest 
$400million in 1993 with just six sites of which two were overseas, to $1.6billion  
(Pugh, 2002) with 16 sites around the world (Wilson, 2003). Thus over an eight year 
period Rolls-Royce created the infrastructure to enable it to offer MRO services on a 
worldwide basis, with major facilities across the world. 
 
*********** 
Insert Table 2 
*********** 
 
However reorganisation of its repair and overhaul operations was only a one part of 
the company’s new customer-centric strategy. A key part of re-shaping the company’s 
business strategy was extracting significantly more value from its installed base of 
engines. To do this Rolls-Royce developed a completely different type of service 
offering. Rather than services provided on a conventional ‘time and materials’ basis 
like its competitors the in-house engineering divisions of the bigger airlines and the 
independent MRO providers, Rolls-Royce broke new ground by offering its 
customers an ‘integrated solution’ (Wise and Baumgartner, 1999: 138) in the form of 
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fixed price maintenance based on engine availability. This new type of performance 
based service contract was initially marketed as ‘power-by-the-hour’.  
 
4.3 Power-by-the-hour 
 
for the US Navy 
An example of the new style performance based contracts being offered by Rolls-
Royce was its contract with the US Navy signed in September 2003 (Rolls-Royce, 
2005a) for the provision of maintenance and logistical support for the Rolls-Royce 
Turbomeca F405 Adour engines that powered the navy’s 200 strong fleet of Boeing/ 
BAE Systems T-45 Goshawk advanced naval jet trainer aircraft.  
 
Under the terms of the contract Rolls-Royce was to be the sole provider of logistics 
support, receiving a fixed price for each hour the engines were in the air. This meant 
Rolls-Royce providing all the engine maintenance, support, trouble-shooting, parts 
supply and logistics support for the aircraft at three naval air stations in Meridian in 
Mississippi, Kingsville in Texas and Patuxent River in Maryland. Performance was 
measured almost exclusively against the fleet metric of providing a minimum level of 
ready-for-issue (RFI) engine availability, which previously had averaged 70 per cent, 
meaning that aircraft were out of action for nearly one third of the available time. As 
part of the new contract Rolls-Royce guaranteed an improved RFI engine availability 
rate of 80 per cent.  
 
For the US Navy, the switch to performance-based maintenance contracts of this type, 
offered three potential benefits. Firstly it meant that as the aircraft operator it avoided 
the uncertainty of unpredictable breakdowns and repair costs. Instead maintenance 
became a known and certain fixed cost against which it could plan. The second 
potential benefit was an improved level of service, manifest in increased RFI engine 
availability and therefore flying time. Finally these services were now provided at a 
lower cost.  
 
************ 
Insert Figure 6 
************ 
 
The success of the initial one year contract, led to a significant improvement in 
maintenance quality and performance reliability, with all the performance metrics 
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being met. As a result the US Navy exercised its option to renew the contract for a 
further four years.  Two years into the contract in 2005, the program manager for the 
US Navy’s Undergraduate Flight Training Systems at Patuxent River, Maryland, 
commented that RFI engine availability on the T-45 Goshawk trainers had risen above 
the target rate of 80 per cent in the initial year reaching 85 per cent, while the average 
time between engine removals had increased from 700 hours to over 900 hours and 
the expected engine removal rate had fallen by 15 per cent (Terino, 2005). As Captain 
Daniel Ouimette, Commodore of Training Air Wing ONE, commented, ‘Before 
signing the contract with Rolls-Royce we had aircraft on the ground because of 
engine availability, but this has never happened under the new regime’ (Rolls-Royce, 
2005b: 19). 
 
It wasn’t only in operational terms that Rolls-Royce’s power-by-the-hour contract 
proved beneficial to the US Navy, there were financial gains as well. The contract 
brought significant cost savings over the previous arrangements. As figure 6 shows in 
the contract’s first three years the Navy’s savings amounted to $15 million, $18 
million and $5 million respectively (Kratz, 2008), with total savings over the five year 
life of the contract projected to total $61 million. In 2008, upon the conclusion of the 
fifth year of the contract, a new expanded five year contract was signed, worth 
$90million per year  (Rolls-Royce, 2009) on similar terms but under the 
MissionCare
™ 
label, the new name for Rolls-Royce’s aftermarket services for the 
Defence sector.  
 
 
4.4 The Growth of Aftermarket Services 
 
The contract with the US Navy is typical of the performance based contracts that 
Rolls-Royce now provides as part of its range of enhanced aftermarket services. In the 
civil aviation sector these services are offered as TotalCare
®
, comprising a range of 
packages that allow airlines to select from a menu of aftermarket services on an 
agreed scale of costs per flight hour. In these deals Rolls-Royce maintains the airlines’ 
engines on a planned maintenance basis on behalf of the customer (Rolls-Royce, 2003: 
13). Similar arrangements are available in the defence and corporate sectors offered as 
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MissionCare
™
  and CorporateCare
®
 respectively. In each instance the services form a 
comprehensive set of through life engine maintenance arrangements. 
 
To support these service packages in March 2004 Rolls-Royce opened an Operations 
Centre at its Derby headquarters, capable of remotely monitoring an airline customers’ 
engines on a 24-hour basis (Rolls-Royce, 2005a). It provides an integrated decision 
support system, coordinating data from aircraft, engine and overhaul shops with 
logistics support and engineering knowledge. The Operations Centre maintains the 
3,500 engines that Rolls-Royce has under management whether on the ground or in 
the air, on a real time basis via telemetry systems. Thus if an engine’s performance 
falters for any reason while it is airborne, this will be picked up by the Operations 
Centre. Staff at the Operations Centre can then pull up the engine’s history and 
mobilise appropriate maintenance resources on the ground ready to service the aircraft 
when it lands.  
 
************ 
Insert Figure 7 
************ 
 
The growth of aftermarket services such as the new style performance based 
maintenance contracts, resulted in increased revenue for Rolls-Royce.  By delivering 
integrated solutions, the company was providing significantly more value. No longer 
was it just a spare parts supplier, it was now providing a range of maintenance and 
repair services as well. The increased revenue that these services brought in was 
reflected in a significant increase in the proportion of Rolls-Royce’s total revenue 
derived from services.  
 
20 years ago in 1991 services represented just 25 per cent of the company’s total 
revenue (Rolls-Royce, 2002: 17). By 2000 the proportion of revenue derived from 
services had risen to over a third (Rolls-Royce, 2001: 12), representing 37.5 per cent 
of its total revenue of £5.56 billion. Although part of the growth was accounted for by 
finance and leasing activity, nonetheless a significant proportion was accounted for by 
repair and overhaul work. This had doubled in value over the previous five years 
(Rolls-Royce, 2001: 12). By 2011, revenue from services had continued to grow 
reaching £6.02 billion, and amounting to more than half (53.4 per cent) of Rolls-
Royce’s total revenue (Rolls-Royce, 2012: 13) of £11.28 billion (see figure 7). 
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4.5 Changing Competitive Positions in the Market for Aftermarket Services 
Aftermarket services in the form of MRO had traditionally been provided by the 
airlines themselves, by independent firms or by the OEMs.  MRO was something that 
historically all three engine manufacturers had collectively neglected over the years. 
Indeed the traditional view in the sector had been, ‘…if you have a Chevrolet, you 
don’t take it back to Detroit to fix it’ (Lewis, 1999: 54), but by the 1990s all three 
manufacturers were starting to ‘recognise lifecycle opportunities’. With the OEMs 
keen and able to increase their share of this market through the provision, as the US 
Navy example illustrates, of better and more effective maintenance, changes in the 
competitive positions of the service providers resulted.  Hence by 2003 it was being 
reported that, ‘the trend has been for airlines to increase outsourcing, original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to increase their share of MRO work, and 
independents to increasingly disappear’ (Wilson, 2003: 4).  
 
In reality the picture was a little more complex. Not all airlines chose to outsource 
their MRO work to OEMs. Doganis (2006: 285) notes that some of the larger 
international carriers saw in MRO, ‘the potential value of these activities as profit 
generators in their own right’. As a result carriers like Lufthansa in Europe and 
Singapore Airlines in Asia, ‘set about transforming what were previously internal 
departments into specialist companies’. However such instances tended to be the 
exception rather than the rule. Most small and medium sized airlines  were too small 
to provide all the MRO services economically, especially as the greater technological 
sophistication of modern jet engines required them to invest in increasingly 
sophisticated maintenance equipment and more highly trained staff. For such carriers 
outsourcing MRO made economic sense. It also allowed them to focus on their core 
activities, something that military customers like the US Navy also preferred to do. 
 
It was a similar story with the new and rapidly expanding low cost carriers (LCCs) 
like Ryanair (Barratt, 2004) and easyJet (Jones, 2005). Given their business model 
which relied on keeping processes simple and costs low (Holloway, 2008), LCCs 
were  keen to lower their direct operating costs, with the result that they sought to 
outsource as many activities as possible and maintenance was an obvious choice. By 
so doing they could avoid, ‘top-heavy maintenance administration, or costly hangars 
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and maintenance facilities of their own’ (Doganis, 2010: 142), and the OEMs were 
well placed to take on the MRO work being outsourced in this way. The Irish LCC 
Ryanair was typical. In 2004 it announced that it was outsourcing the maintenance 
and overhaul of all the CFM56-7 series engines powering its fleet of Boeing 737-800 
aircraft to GE Engine Services as part of a10 year contract involving a maintenance 
cost per hour system  (Professional Engineering, 2004: 12). 
 
Independent MRO firms found themselves increasingly squeezed. The introduction of 
a new generation of technologically more sophisticated and reliable engine in the 
early 2000s provided what Wilson (2003: 4) described as, ‘a double hit on 
independent shops – higher investment and lower demand’. Higher investment was 
required because of the new technologies being used, such as FADECs, while the 
decline in demand was the product of airlines switching to OEMs. As the general 
manager of one independent noted, ‘the OEMs are trying to gain a larger share of the 
market by buying or co-venturing with independents or putting them out of business’ 
(Wilson, 2003: 5). 
 
Hence in the last 10 years we have seen the OEMs gain market share at the expense of 
the airlines and the independents especially. These changes in competitive position  
were largely attributable to advances in technology. New technologies made it 
possible for OEMs, by virtue of the data they were now able to collect and analyse 
regarding their engines, to offer a better and more effective service, while at the same 
time making it harder for small and medium airlines and independents to compete on 
the  same terms, a situation compounded by the introduction of new business models 
by the LCCs. 
 
 
5. Analysis 
Rolls-Royce was not alone in feeling the impact of a significant drop in the demand 
for spares. The two other engine manufacturers with the capacity to produce a full 
range of civil  and military engines, Rolls-Royce’s American rivals, General Electric 
and Pratt and Whitney, were faced with very similar issues in terms of the decline in 
the demand for engine spares.  
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As the case study shows General Electric and Pratt and Whitney had also contributed 
significant advances in engine technology, both in terms of new manufacturing 
processes and component improvements. Consequently by the 1990s they too were 
feeling the impact of the steady and continuous improvements in engine performance 
both in terms of efficiency and durability. As one commentator explained, ‘by 
designing and producing ever more reliable and competitive powerplants, engine 
manufacturers have fallen victim to their own success’ (Lewis, 1999: 54). A similar 
theme was echoed at General Electric.  Brian Rowe, former head of GE Aircraft 
Engines speaking of the new ultra high thrust GE90 engine that came into service in 
the late 1990s commented, ‘… the engines just seem to run forever’ (Rowe, 2005: 
144). It was a similar story at Pratt and Whitney where Jim Keenan, senior vice 
president of commercial engines noted in 2003 that, ‘today’s generation of engine 
enters the shop nominally about one third as often as a typical engine 25 years ago’ 
(Wilson (2003: 5).   
 
Rolls-Royce was perhaps the first to feel the impact of the improvements in engine 
durability, because having only recently increased its share of the world market for 
commercial engines from 10 per cent in the mid-1980s to 30 per cent in the late-1990s 
(Pugh, 2002: 306) its installed engine base was relatively ‘youthful’. As such its 
installed engine base included a higher proportion of newer and therefore more 
durable engines with a much lower spares requirement. 
 
Nonetheless by the late 1990s all three manufacturers had launched new large 
diameter, wide chord fan engines for the new generation of large twin jet airliners 
being introduced by Boeing and Airbus. These engines all incorporated the latest 
technology including FADEC electronic control systems, with the result that all three 
saw a decline in their most profitable revenue stream - replacement parts. This led all 
three to take a new perspective on maintenance, repair and overhaul work (MRO) 
 
However, as one commentator noted at the time, ‘General Electric, Rolls-Royce and 
Pratt and Whitney have taken slightly different approaches to the changing MRO 
market, although all three are seeking a greater share of the pie’ (Wilson, 2003: 6). 
While Rolls-Royce’ relied on joint ventures with international airlines particularly 
ones from Asia, General Electric, having first consolidated its Engine Services 
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department and its Commercial Spare Parts operation into a single organisation, 
General Electric Aircraft Engine Services (GEAES), utilized a series of take-overs 
designed to complement its existing facilities in California and Kansas in the US and 
create a worldwide engine service network. It purchased British Airways engine 
overhaul facility at Cardiff in Wales (Pugh, 2002; Rowe, 2005), followed by the 
purchase of Greenwich Air Services in the US, a 70 per cent stake in Malaysia 
Airlines’ Aero Engines Repair and Overhaul (AERO), a 20 per cent stake in EVA 
Airways’ Evergreen Aviation Technologies  in Taiwan and a 95 per cent stake in the 
engine service arm of the Brazilian airline Varig (Lewis, 1999: 55). Pratt and Whitney 
on the other hand, took a different approach again.  As the former market leader with 
90 per cent market share in the 1960s it already had an established worldwide network 
of some two dozen existing MRO facilities around the world (Markillie, 1999) and it  
used these facilities to create five  specialist engine overhaul and repair centres 
(Wilson, 2003: 6). 
 
But it was not merely a case of the engine manufacturers doing more MRO work. A  
report at the end of the 1990s noted, ‘manufacturers are not looking simply to develop 
and extend their geographical coverage, but also the commercial scope of their 
aftersales activity’ (Lewis, 1999: 54). Bill Vareschi, president of GE Engine Services 
described the new services as, ‘We’re bringing airlines new procedures and processes 
that optimise workscope, lower the cost of operations and reduce the time taken for 
engine repair and overhauls’ (Lewis, 1999: 54). Extending the scope of their 
aftermarket activities meant General Electric followed Rolls-Royce in offering 
services like on-wing support, maintenance hours agreements and total care packages 
alongside conventional repair and overhaul services. Pratt and Whitney followed too, 
leading one independent MRO provider to note, ‘the OEMs are selling total repair, 
power-by-the-hour packages; that’s the strategy on all new engines coming out of the 
OEMs’ (Wilson, 2003: 6). 
 
Hence the re-shaped business strategy developed by Rolls-Royce and described in  the 
case  study had by the decade of the 2000s, been adopted by all three of the main 
engine manufacturers that dominate the aero engine sector, and in each instance 
technology was a powerful influence in the re-shaping of business strategy.  
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Signs of a similar trend in other sectors are limited. Technologies very similar to those 
employed in the aero sector, involving remote monitoring, have been introduced in 
Formula 1 motor racing. Groups of technicians located at a team’s headquarters often 
on the other side of the world, closely monitor each racing car’s systems  during races 
to ensure optimum performance and maximise the chances of winning. But this 
remains a very limited and highly specialised application. Such technologies have yet 
to be used more generally in the automotive industry, where institutional factors mean 
that maintenance and repair services remain the province of the dealer network 
(Maxton and Wormald (2004).   Servitization is however found in sectors producing 
high value, long lived capital goods. Examples include manufacturers of trains, 
mobile communication systems and flight simulators. But in these instances a study 
by Davies (2004) suggests that changes of strategy are the product not of advances in 
technology but changing customer demands. 
 
6. Conclusions 
While much has been written about the movement of manufacturers into services, this 
study breaks new ground by considering the contribution of technology to this process. 
At the outset a single question was posed. What role did technology play in inducing 
the aero engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce to re-shape its business strategy? The 
principal finding is that in Rolls-Royce’s case advances in technology played a very 
important part in the company’s decision to re-shape its business strategy utilizing 
servitization.  
 
The advances in technology were not major technological discontinuities (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986) or radical in character, resulting in what Christensen (1997: xiii) 
terms ‘disruptive innovation’.  Rather the advances in technology were the product of 
cumulative incremental innovations in materials, design and manufacturing, that 
formed ‘sustaining technologies’ (Christensen, 1997: xv)  that helped to foster 
improved performance in established products along lines valued by mainstream 
customers.  
 
The improved performance focused on greater durability and reliability, and reduced 
the demand for spares which had long been the company’s most profitable revenue 
stream. This led Rolls-Royce to look to servitization to make up for this loss and the 
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case study shows that technology was a powerful enabling factor facilitating the move 
to servitization in this sector. Technology, particularly developments in digital 
electronics in the form of FADEC systems, transformed the scope of the  maintenance 
services provided by the engine manufacturers. The engine health monitoring 
capabilities made possible by the introduction of electronic FADEC systems  
facilitated the introduction of service innovations such as fixed price per hour 
maintenance contracts.  
 
While the study suffers from the limitation that one cannot generalize from a single 
case, nonetheless it is evident from the analysis section of this study that as far as the 
aero engine sector is concerned Rolls-Royce was not an isolated case. Not 
unsurprisingly in this highly oligopolistic sector, Rolls-Royce’s rivals, General 
Electric and Pratt and Whitney, were similarly affected and followed broadly similar 
strategies, though it was generally Rolls-Royce that led the way certainly in terms of 
some of the service innovations that resulted from greater knowledge of engine 
performance data.  
 
What the case study lacks in terms of scope for generalization, like many cases 
studies (Stake, 1995),  it makes up for in the value of the insights it provides. In 
particular there are a number of important implications that follow from this study. 
The first is in terms of the provision of a better quality service. In the past where 
MRO was concerned there was  a mis-alignment between the interests of OEMs and 
users of their products. For the former, MRO was an important source of profit  
because of the high prices charged for replacement parts, while for the latter MRO  
was a cost that ate into profit.  Now, as providers of fixed price maintenance services 
it is very much in the OEMs’ interest to take every opportunity to learn where and 
how things go wrong and revise and improve their products, so as to reduce the cost 
of providing repairs and maintenance, something that is similarly  in the interests of 
users.  
 
Secondly, the enormous amount of data on engine performance that is now available 
in real time thanks to FADEC systems, presents new opportunities when it comes to 
the development of new services. The challenge is to develop appropriate knowledge 
management techniques to utilize this data. This will require OEMs to develop new 
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areas of expertise, and it is interesting to note that Rolls-Royce has set up a joint 
venture with Data Systems and Solutions, a subsidiary of US-based Science 
Applications International Corporation (Hutchinson, 2003) in order to expand its 
expertise in the area of aftermarket information systems.     
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Figure 1 
 
Schema of a Modern Jet Engine 
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Figure 2 
Improvements in Specific Fuel Consumption of Civil Jet Engines 1950-2000 
 
Source: Whitford (2007: p116)  
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Figure 3 
Applications of Wide Chord Titanium Fan Blade Technology 
 
Source: Baldwin (1993) 
 
Figure 4 
Annual Deliveries of Rolls-Royce Civil Engines 1995-2010 
 
 
Source: Rolls-Royce Annual reports 1998-2010 
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Figure 5 
Aftermarket Competitiveness 
 
 
 
Source: Lorrell et al. (2000: 129) 
 
Figure 6 
T-45 Engine Costs: Power-by-the-hour
®
 v. Original 
 
 
 
 
Note: Power-by-the-hour
®
  costs for 2006 and 2007 are estimates 
Source: Kratz (2008) 
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Figure 7 
Rolls-Royce’s Total/Service Revenue 2000-10 (£m) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rolls-Royce Annual Reports 2000-2011  
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Table 1 
 
Comparative Performance of Rolls-Royce engines 
 
 Conway 
RCo.12 
(1960) 
Trent 
892 
(1998) 
Application 
 
Boeing 707 Boeing 777 
Max. thrust 
(lbs.) 
17,500 91,500 
Engine weight 
(lbs.) 
5,147 16,000 
Bypass  
ratio 
0.3:1 6.5:1 
Turbine inlet 
temperature 
(TET) (ᵒC) 
1,050 1,750 
Specific Fuel 
Consumption 
(SFC) 
(lb/hr/lb) 
0.87 0.575 
Pressure  
ratio 
15:1 40.8:1 
Thrust;weight 
ratio 
3.4:1 5.7:1 
 
Sources: Davis (2010); Gunston (1995); Kay (2007); Owen (2001);  
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Table 2 
Rolls-Royce’s Principal MRO related collaborations 
 
Year Venture Form Partner Location 
1996 Hong Kong Aero Engine 
Services Ltd (HAESL) 
JV HAECO China 
1998  Texas Aero Engine Services Ltd 
(TAESL) 
JV American Airlines USA 
1998 International Aero Engine 
Component Overhaul (IECO) 
Pte Ltd 
JV Singapore Int. Airlines Singapore 
1998 Data Systems & Solutions JV Science Applications 
International Corp. 
UK 
1999 National Airmotive 
 
Acquisition n/a USA 
2004 N3 Engine Overhaul Services 
 
JV Lufthansa Technik AG Germany 
 
Source: Pugh (2002); Rolls-Royce Annual Reports 1994-2004 
 
 
Djs/Re-shaping Business Strategy_v1.6/11.09.12 
